

THE COST-BENEFIT CALCULATION MODEL: IS IT A USEFUL TOOL TO ANALYZE WAR TERMINATION

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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ABSTRACT

The Cost-Benefit Calculation Model: Is it a Useful Tool to Analyze War Termination? By Major Christopher J. Rizzo, USA, 59 pages.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has faced increasing pressure from other countries to take the lead in resolving regional conflicts. As a result, much debate has occurred on determining when to enter a conflict and not much thought is often given to how to end conflicts. The cost-benefit calculation model is considered by many scholars to be a standard by which modern states determine when to conclude a conflict. Simply stated, state's leaders will pursue their objectives until a point is reached where the costs exceed the benefit or war aims. The theory stems from the writings of Clausewitz. The monograph examines whether the cost-benefit model for war termination is sensitive to conditions of the military and domestic situations, economic conditions, and expectations of external assistance.

The monograph begins by explaining the model and the many factors that affect the model. The factors include internal power struggles, public opinion, domestic politics, and the affect of casualties on the war effort. Three case studies are then analyzed to determine why war goes beyond the obvious cost-benefit calculation. Germany's actions during World War I, Japan's decisions in World War II, and the United States policies in Vietnam provide the basis of analysis. All historical examples examined exemplify that the countries use of the cost-benefit model was not sensitive to the military, domestic, and economic conditions as well as the expected external assistance.

The paper concludes by stating that although the model use was not sensitive to the examined conditions, the model still provides an acceptable framework in which to consider war termination.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction	1
II. The Theory of the Cost-Benefit Calculation Model	4
III. War Termination Case Studies and the Cost-Benefit Model	12
A. Germany's Miscalculations During World War I	12
B. Japan's Dilemma for Peace	22
C. US and the Vietnam War	34
IV. Conclusion	43
Endnotes	49
Selected Bibliography	55

*"The object of war is a better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you devise."*¹

B.H. Liddell-Hart

I. Introduction

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has faced increasing pressure from other countries to take the lead in resolving regional conflicts. Bosnia, Haiti, and the on-going unrest in Central Africa are all excellent examples. Ironically, conflict termination doctrine, the method to seek an acceptable peace, is not very well understood by either the political or military establishment. Although much has been written on the subject, it is often the last item to be considered when a conflict erupts.

Conflict or war termination very rarely achieves long term peace for either party involved. This fact is disheartening when one considers the extraordinary amount of resources and human life expended during conflicts. Nations too often enter a conflict with no clear vision of how to resolve the matter of dispute. As a result, these conflicts re-emerge and more resources and lives are lost. The premier example in this century is the Treaty of Versailles settlement, which failed to meet the expectations either of Germany or the Allies, and which many regard as the cause of the Second World War.

What makes conflict termination so difficult are the many factors that affect a lasting resolution. Diplomatic, informational, economic, and military elements are all intermingled when leaders ponder the decision to terminate a conflict. Often the military force, in and of itself, cannot achieve resolution without cooperative and coordinated diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts. This directed, holistic approach of all national instruments of power is achieved very rarely. Moreover, in cases involving more

than two states in coalition, the actions of another need to be coordinated, along with one's own. Complicating this process is the need to consider the different national interests of all coalition partners. Additionally, the nature of a conflict, and its real or potential repercussions on or in a region, are often misunderstood. Determining the conditions for, and timing the resolution of, a conflict are often planning considerations thought about in hindsight. These last points, under what conditions and when to seek conflict termination, are the focus of this paper.

Apparently, finding a way to stop a war early is less expensive than keeping it going. What is less apparent is why this is often not done. The purpose of this paper is to examine three cases where such a calculation would seem to have been appropriate, to find out why it was not made or accepted, and to determine what emerges when the cost-benefit analysis model is used as a tool of strategic decision making. The research question of this monograph follows: Is the cost-benefit calculation model for war termination sensitive to conditions of military and domestic situations, economic conditions, and expectations of external assistance? If so, what can one conclude about the use of this model for shaping strategic policy?

The cost-benefit calculation theory is a rational approach to war termination and is considered by many scholars to be a standard by which modern states determine when to conclude a conflict.² Simply stated, a state's leaders will pursue their objectives or war aims until a point is reached where the costs of continuing are not worth the objectives sought. At that time, the leaders will decide to terminate the war, realizing, unless one side overthrows the other, the contest remains two sided until both sides reach agreement. The aim is to have the adversary recognize a point of culmination as well so that he

consents to a cease-fire and peace negotiations.³ On the surface, this model appears logical and an appropriate tool with which to explain under what conditions and when one can expect war termination to occur.

Several reasons exist as to why the model may be a preferred approach. First, not all wars end with winners and losers. Most wars end in a stalemate. Second, the cost-benefit model explains why the weaker party usually stops fighting before its strength is completely exhausted. Finally, the costs of war accumulate. Dead and wounded, financial costs, and material resources are wasted and losses increase. These increases, however, may have a decreasing marginal effect on the attainment of a state's objectives or war aims.⁴

The monograph will begin by explaining the cost-benefit calculation model by examining the model's assumptions, factors, relationships, and limitations. Analysis will extend to exploration of the internal dynamics of governmental decision making that may be expected to influence rational choice. Historical case studies will be presented to contribute to the understanding of the working of the model. Finally, conclusions will be offered as to the utility of the cost-benefit calculation model as a means of anticipating the point for conflict termination.

Additionally, the underlying purpose of this paper is to expose military planners to the many considerations that influence application of the cost-benefit model in order that they understand the intricacies of war termination. Since army and joint doctrine are based largely on this model, it is important that military planners understand its application in a holistic sense.⁵ The terms war and conflict will be used synonymously, and termination refers only to the cessation of fighting.

*"War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."
"No one starts a war ... or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so ... without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."*⁶

Carl von Clausewitz

II. The Theory of the Cost-Benefit Calculation Model

The cost-benefit calculation model is designed to predict the appropriate time to negotiate a peace settlement. This model is a rational approach that assumes that the belligerents have sufficient information available to make the necessary cost and benefit calculations concerning the decision of when to terminate a war. The theory is based on Clausewitz's classic statement:

Of even greater influence on the decision to make peace is the consciousness of all the effort that has already been made and of the effort yet to come. Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.

We see then that if one side cannot completely disarm the other, the desire for peace on either side will rise and fall with the probability of further successes and the amount of effort these would require. If such incentives were of equal strength on both sides, the two would resolve their political disputes by meeting half way.⁷

In modern war, while the military instrument is surely one of the dominant forces for international struggles, diplomatic and economic factors are likely to be tightly interwoven to achieve the desired objective. The use of economic sanctions to influence the actions of Serbia and Iraq are two recent examples. Central to Clausewitz's theory of war is the notion that war is not an end unto itself, but a means to a political end. In arriving at the decision to terminate a war, a nation must be satisfied that the aims of the

war effort have been achieved, or *that the aims cannot be achieved at an acceptable cost*, then the rational decision is to negotiate a peace settlement.

The main assumption that drives this concept is the idea that both actors in a conflict behave rationally according to estimates of cost and gain. A rational actor is one who can estimate that the continuation of the struggle possesses no hope of achieving his country's goals and draws the appropriate conclusions. This assumption is accompanied by several others. The first is that one or both sides are uniactors, with single identifiable centers of decision. The second assumes that one or both sides can estimate approximately the values, goals, and their respective worth for, which they are fighting, as well as the values, goals, and the respective worth placed on the same (or opposite) goals by their enemy. It is important to note that values are not necessarily equivalent. One side may indeed be willing to expend more effort than the opponent, both relatively and absolutely. The third assumption claims that each side possesses all the necessary information to evaluate their power and that of the enemy to continue fighting. Therefore each side can approximate the relative present and future power the other can bring to bear on the continued battle. Finally, one or both of the belligerents can and will identify and compare the anticipated cost of all available courses of action.⁸ If these assumptions are not realized, then the model begins to deviate from its theoretical foundation.

The factors that affect the model's assumptions are many. Internal power struggles, public opinion and external pressures can all affect the central decision maker. In his book, Stopping Wars, James Smith discusses how decision-making structures within domestic politics greatly affect the question of war termination. He examines three

belligerent “inner circle” structures that are dependent on the amount of power they possess and the willingness of this inner circle to criticize the leader’s actions.

In the first structure, termed, “We didn’t dare consider it,” the leader is pressing for victory at any cost, even where it is obvious to the inner circle that such a goal is unattainable.⁹ The possibility of a cease-fire will not be raised for fear of being thought of as a traitor. Whether the inner circle has high or low power, the result is the same: the inner circle lacks the fortitude to criticize a leadership unwilling to consider cease-fire. In this first case, the leader’s commitment for victory at any cost can hardly be considered rational.

In Smith’s second structure termed, “The leadership just won’t listen,” is characterized by a moderate to high emergent criticism, but low inner circle power.¹⁰ Since the group has little or no power, the leader is not bound to listen. One variant of this structure occurs when coalitions are formed. Although a leader is usually elected, actual decision-making is left in the hands of the group. The distinction between the leader and the inner circle develops into a distinction between those opting for peace, the “doves,” and those opting to continue the war, the “hawks.” This structure provides greater opportunities for peace but are determined by the willingness of the leader to listen and the leader’s reaction to the criticism. In the case of a coalition, a consensus is normally needed before a peace can be reached.

The third structure, “The leader and inner circle couldn’t agree,” is characterized by high emergent criticism and moderate to high power for the inner circle.¹¹ Here, the inner circle not only believes that a cease-fire is the proper course of action but is also willing to state these opinions openly. The primary difficulty lies in the estimate made by

those external to the process of relative power exercised by this group. When other belligerents perceive the views of peace are emerging and support these efforts, but a cease-fire fails to materialize, distrust and divisiveness spread both internationally and domestically. Although this structure offers the best chances for a peace settlement, it depends entirely on the group's actual ability to influence the leader to change policy. All three structures exemplify how the different relationships between the leader and his advisors can vary the possibility of negotiations. The various possibilities expressed by Smith find more detailed explanation in a series of essays by other scholars.

In his classic study, Every War Must End, Fred Ikle expounds further on the effects of domestic politics and how they cloud the cost benefit calculation, stating:

The political struggle within each country affects everything that matters in ending a war. It intrudes into the formulation of the war aims, it colors and even distorts military estimates, and it inhibits negotiations with the enemy. The views people hold on these matters are interdependent. Those who want their country to pursue ambitious war aims will seek out the favorable military estimates and find reasons why negotiations ought to be avoided. Those who want negotiations to move ahead will select the unfavorable military estimates to argue that war aims should be scaled down.¹²

When such a dichotomy exists in a nation, reaching a consensus can be very difficult. A determined and steady national leader may be the only hope to overcome this dilemma.

In a 1970's essay, Morton Halperin offers still another opinion on the internal source of friction that arises when one considers war termination: civil-military relations.¹³ He begins by dividing the military component into several domains: the field command, the various services, and the general staff that advises the senior civilian leadership. Each possesses its own interests and ability to affect termination. Likewise, the civilian

perspective can differ between the executive, legislative branch, and foreign office officials. When considering whether to continue a war, or on what conditions to be prepared to terminate it, the executive frequently looks to military leaders for this information. If the military is divided on the issue, the decision can become difficult. Because they have control over much pertinent information, the military can maneuver to make the outcome they seek more likely. When the military's outcome differs from that of the foreign office or legislature, indecision and political quagmire can erupt for the executive.

In another article, Robert Randle presents the variety of domestic pressures that may skew any attempts to utilize the cost-benefit calculation model.¹⁴ He mentions how the public, who are called upon to make heavy material and personal sacrifices, may demand peace under various situations such as a lengthy war, battlefield defeats, threat of invasion, or a shift in values toward the war. In response to public opinion, the legislature may threaten to withhold appropriations for war-related activities, hold public debates to carry the opposition of the war to the executive, or pass laws that may hamper the executive. Elites in business, academia, religion, and social groups may threaten the continuation of war if they feel their interests or values are endangered. Finally, Randle suggests that decision-makers themselves, until they experience a shift from their ideological values to either a more modest or pragmatic aims, are likely to refuse to make the decisions necessary for peace. Randle's last point about different ideologies can be a very strong barrier to peace negotiations.

In a related study of war moods, Lewis Richardson equates war weariness to an epidemic that spreads into the population.¹⁵ Support for the war is high at the beginning

of the fighting then gradually declines as "susceptible" people become infected with war weariness. Richardson actually provides a quantitative estimate that supposes hostilities will end when about half of the survivors are unwilling to continue the struggle. The factors he cites for the epidemic are wounds to oneself, casualties to acquaintances, a growing scarcity of food and clothing as well as other inconveniences due to war. Thus, Richardson sees these increasing costs as a decisive element in ending wars.

Frank Klingberg and John Voevodsky attempt to establish a fixed, repetitive relationship between battle casualties and war termination. Klingberg reasoned he could discern such a relationship in a few major wars, but admitted that his initial hypothesis could not be upheld for the whole group of wars he examined. He concludes by stating it is not possible "to predict accurately during a war how long the war will last."¹⁶ Voevodsky claimed that there are certain relationships between battle casualties and battle strengths which constitute limits beyond which a nation either accepts defeat, changes its leadership, or acquires new allies. He defined these limits by the lower boundary level, where battle casualties and battle strengths are equal. In other words, when the accumulated total of battle casualties from the beginning of a war equals the total number of men deployed in a battle zone, a nation will seek one of the above conditions. He argues that this lower level "represents a boundary to the right of which a nation cannot seem to pass and still sustain its own war effort."¹⁷

Finally, from a purely economic perspective, Robert Gilpin professes a rational choice theory by stating,

Rational-choice theory ... assumes that individual behavior is determined wholly by rationality, that is, individuals seek to maximize, or at least to satisfy certain values or interest at the lowest possible cost to themselves. In this context,

rationality applies only to the endeavor, not the outcome; failure to achieve an objective because of ignorance or some other factor does not invalidate the rationalist premise that individualist premise that individuals act on the basis of a cost/benefit or means/ends calculation. Finally, it holds that individuals will seek to acquire their objectives until a market equilibrium is reached; that is, individuals will pursue an objective until the associated costs are equal to the realized benefits.¹⁸

Although Gilpin is not interested merely in war termination, his assumptions about rational choice and cost-benefit underlie his analysis of why states decide to stop their attempts to change the international order through war and decide instead to seek peace, are pertinent to the cost benefit calculation model.

In summary, there are a variety of factors that influence the calculation in the cost-benefit model. These range from internal struggles in the form of domestic politics, public opinion, civil-military relations to battle casualties, economic cost and external influences. The underlining function of the model, however, still hinges on the final understanding of the ends-means relationship. The ends must justify the means. If the means or costs outweigh the ends or benefit, then the belligerent under consideration is not acting rationally. What clearly clouds this determination is the actor's ability to measure accurately his and his opponent's values, aims, and the respective final worth placed on these aims. Thus, measuring a belligerent's commitment, the enemy's, or one's own remains a speculative problem. Obviously, possessing accurate information to evaluate your own and your opponent's potential power is a limiting factor. Finally, the ability to identify and compare anticipated costs of both participants' available courses of action can also be a limitation.

Therefore, one must ask, is the model useful as a theoretical tool to determine when war termination should occur? If used correctly and successfully, a cost-benefit analysis should produce an obvious benefit. Some reasonable calculation of acceptability must be used as a standard of judgment. This calculation should cover four areas. The first must determine whether the military situation is improving or declining. The second evaluation must ascertain whether the domestic situation is stable. Third, is the economy in satisfactory condition. Finally, the last assessment must determine whether external help is forthcoming. If the answers to these questions are negative, then the belligerent should cut his losses and negotiate for peace. The monograph will examine three cases studies to determine under what conditions the cost-benefit calculation model for war termination seems likely to work or discover why so obvious a resolution proves in practice so difficult to obtain.

*"A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is subject to considerable uncertainty."*¹⁹

Carl von Clausewitz

III. War Termination Case Studies and the Cost-Benefit Model

A. Germany's Miscalculations during World War I

German peace initiatives in World War I provide examples to analyze war termination utilizing the cost-benefit model. Both major efforts, one to dictate peace consequent to undertaking unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, the other to accede to peace from a position of weakness in 1918, failed to achieve the desired outcome. The monograph will outline these events and then explain where errors occurred in their cost-benefit approach.

Without getting into why World War I began, essentially, Germany had no stated objectives. In fact, they refused to bind themselves in advance to any formal announcement of their war aims. When initial victories occurred, German businessmen talked of the annexation of Belgium, the grabbing of French colonies, and the expansion of her continental territory. At the same time, intellectuals claimed the war was being fought for the defense and glory of the German culture.²⁰ With no clear purpose emanating from the German government, the situation in late 1916 can only lead one to conclude that self-preservation or at least maintenance of the status quo was the final object.

The battle of Somme was the Allies "Big Push" to defeat Germany. It ran from 1 July to 19 November 1916 and, along with the battles around Verdun, as well as those on the Eastern Front, resulted in a stalemate on all fronts. The deadlock became so

complete that neither the Allies nor the Central Powers appeared to have a chance of forcing a decision in the field.²¹ To compound the problem, the British naval blockade prevented German war industries from receiving essential war materials and, above all, caused women and children to go hungry, raising infant mortality and sickness.²² In light of these facts, why did Germany begin an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign that continued the prosecution of the war?

As the end of 1916 grew near, military and political leaders debated the direction of the war. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg desired to initiate peace negotiations, but the United States' attempts to hold a peace conference earlier in the year had not been accepted by either Britain or France. In light of recent Allied success along the Somme, hopes of peace appeared slim. Bethmann wanted to take no action that would draw America onto the Allied side. President Woodrow Wilson was already holding the German government accountable for the loss of American lives and property by previous submarine actions. To make matters worse, Austria-Hungary was leaning toward concluding a speedy peace in December of 1916.²³ On the other side, the military leadership wanted to begin an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign to break the stalemate. General Erich Ludendorff asserted aggressively the primacy of the military in settling the war. With the United States already providing economic support to the Allies, the German military and German people already considered America a belligerent.²⁴ The traditional role of political leadership, to decide strategic aims, began to break down. Bethmann essentially was forced to abdicate his authority in the matter to the German military.

As early as 1915, the German naval staff had proposed an indiscriminate submarine campaign against the British designed as an escalation to force Britain to sue for peace. The German naval staff essentially conducted a cost-benefit analysis that considered the economic, political and strategic side-effects of such a campaign. The German analysis was so bold that the staff predicted England would be forced to settle within six months.²⁵

The German analysis carefully weighed all relevant economic aspects by providing a broad array of statistics about England's supply of raw materials, wheat, coal, cotton, wool, oil, and timber. The estimates were conservative and even allowed for the compensation of their lost shipping by considering the reallocation of shipping from the British troops in Greece. The naval staff estimated that an unlimited submarine campaign would sink 600,000 tons per month. The actual losses to the British in the first five months turned out to average 658,000 tons.²⁶ The initial success of the first two months of the campaign, April and May 1917, caused the British Minister of Food to announce that food supplies may not last until the next harvest.²⁷

The possibility of the strongest neutral power, the United States, joining the Allies was also considered. The German naval staff greatly underestimated the shipping capacity of the United States, claiming that American shipping was incapable of transporting large numbers of troops and financially unable to replace the transports that inevitably would be destroyed. The most crucial mistake in Germany's analysis was that they evaluated the effects of America's entry into the war exclusively in light of the prediction that England would sue for peace within their six month forecast. Oddly enough, the advocates of the campaign never mentioned the effects of the sunken tonnage on military supplies. In fact,

a weak harvest in the United States in 1916 only reinforced their estimates. The effort was viewed exclusively as a coercive measure to force England to sue for peace.²⁸

Given this assumption, Germany never planned for political inducements to encourage the British to make peace. In fact, Germany planned no diplomatic discussions so as to deny the British false hopes and allow panic to seize her shipping circles as well as her people. Then, Germany could have launched a diplomatic ploy focused on the US to strengthen her neutrality. Keeping the US neutral throughout these escalation was clearly critical. By ignoring US neutrality, Germany increased the risk of seeking to have Britain sue for peace. Instead, just prior to the unrestricted submarine campaign, it became known to the US that Germany was seeking an alliance with Japan and Mexico for offensive purposes should the US enter the war. This finding so exasperated the US that diplomatic relations between Washington and Berlin were severed.²⁹ If Germany had any hopes of appeasing the US in order to keep her out of the war, the offensive alliance shattered them, and the cost of her submarine escalation efforts would only add to the Allies' will to continue fighting.

By attempting to place a value on the affect Britain's destroyed shipping tonnage, Germany was predicting that Britain's will to continue the war would culminate. The risk was that they would not! The German High Command made no preparations for the plan's failure. Relying exclusively on their careful and precise calculations of destroyed British tonnage, Germany failed to consider any other course of action. Given the stalemate on the western front, Germany's only military option was the unlimited submarine campaign unless they changed their old war aims to a resolution acceptable to the Allies. Since their quest for victory did not change, the German leadership backed into

the all or nothing military course of action. Although during the limited submarine campaign German analysts considered it impossible for England to make peace offers under Lloyd George's leadership of extreme determination, Germany figured their unrestricted efforts would certainly cause the British to sue for peace.³⁰ Given this earlier assessment, their justification for the escalation appears to be purely imaginary.

As events unfolded, on 6 April 1917, two months after the all out submarine campaign began, the US declared war on Germany and led an avalanche of new declarations of war against the Central Power that included half of South America, all of Central America, Portugal, and China.³¹ Although Germany's efforts nearly caused Britain to capitulate, it was US naval cooperation that prevented it. By early-fall, the Allies developed a comprehensive convoy system that all but negated Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign. After several failed German offensives in the west, which began in March 1918 and were expected to lead to a breakthrough by July, Germany was materially spent and driven to seek peace. German's military efforts had clearly failed and political efforts were then in order.

The central question in the autumn of 1918 was how, in view of its perceived annexationalist goals, could Germany now make peaceful intentions creditable at home and to the enemy. The cost of such a peace would mean a change in the German government in order to make the peace acceptable to the Allies. In October 1918, German domestic government underwent change. The wear and tear of the war had greatly damaged the autocratic government in Germany. The truth about the war was finally being understood by the people. This caused internal unrest. At the same time, America led the Allies' call for the German people's representation in the prosecution of

the war. The Allies felt the German people would call an end to the war once they were brought to realize its costs. Both these internal and external pressures caused a parliamentary system to take hold.³²

President Wilson's fourteen point peace plan of "impartial justice" without preferential treatment or distinctions drew the Germans to ask for an armistice and peace talks. On October 4th 1918, Germany requested an armistice and the discussion of peace based on Wilson's fourteen point peace plan, which essentially called for German evacuation of Russia, Belgium, and French territories and the autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary as well as the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro.³³ Germany believed Wilson's plan for peace was an acceptable cost for an ability to concentrate on quailing the domestic upheaval occurring as a result of the transition to a parliamentary government. On 11 November 1918, Germany signed the armistice, believing they would be an active participant in the peace process.³⁴

What Germany may not have suspected was the difference of views between America and her European allies. The European Allies were bent on returning the balance of power to Europe, the reason many had entered the war. America disdained the concept and believed international order should be sought through democracy, collective security, and self-determination. These conflicting views stemmed from President Woodrow Wilson's faith that the nature of man was essentially peaceful, and once the people of the world had tasted the blessings of democracy, they would surely rise as one to defend their gains. Europeans held no such notions and designed to place man's demonstrated selfishness in the service for a higher good - the nation.³⁵ Germany became a victim of this disagreement within the Allied ranks.

When the Paris Peace Conference opened on 18 January 1919, many of these differences were still not worked out between the Allies. The French wanted revenge for the first Treaty of Versailles of 1871, as well as security guarantees and war reparations from Germany. The British disliked the freedom of the seas article. And Italy was nervous about the realignment of her frontiers, fearing the formula for self-determination would not entitle her to the territories that she wished to claim. Wilson's solution to these many disagreements was the League of Nations, which had the responsibility of enforcing the peace and rectifying inequities.³⁶

Germany suffered punitive accords in territorial, economic, and military conditions. The cost of Germany's war involved loss of thirteen percent of her prewar territory. The economically important Upper Silesia was handed over to a newly created Poland. Other economic penalties included the immediate payment of five billion dollars in cash to France, as well as large quantities of coal, as compensation for its damages to mines in eastern France. To make up for ships sunk by German submarines, Britain was awarded most of Germany's merchant marine. Additionally, seven billion dollars of German foreign assets were seized. To offset any further aggression against France, the United States and Britain signed separate alliances with France to protect that country against any future German aggression.³⁷

The most disturbing element of the Treaty of Versailles was Article 231, which stated that Germany was morally responsible for all war damages to the Allies and Associated Governments. The "War Guilt" clause no doubt represented the contemporary Allied opinion of the day. During an Allied conference with German delegates in 1921, Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, stated "For the Allies ... German responsibility

for the war is fundamental. It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.”³⁸ This statement came at a time when Germany was attempting to reconcile herself the harsh reparations that the Treaty of Versailles imposed. Wilson’s Covenant of the League of Nations was designed as a permanent conference of the sovereign Powers for the settlement of disputes that arrived from the original treaty. The “War Guilt” clause only embittered the Germans toward the peace process. They felt they had been tricked, believing Wilson’s fourteen point plan of “impartial justice” was the underpinning of peace talks. When negotiations at Versailles did not allow Germany to make any counter-proposals, Germans coined the phrase “The Dictated Peace of Versailles.”³⁹

The most tragic fallout for Germany and Europe came when the US senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and refused to allow the US to join the League of Nations. As a result, the US, whom the Germans felt would moderate the peace fairly, was never a player in the future political debates that the League of Nations were designed to handle.⁴⁰ Article XIX stated that the League could, “from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of Nations of treaties which had become inapplicable, and the considerations of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”⁴¹ The German leadership failed to consider American’s deep-seeded view that their country should keep out of the complications of European affairs. What resulted was a German people feeling betrayed by the peace process that required reparations designed to weaken her even further than the war. This mistrust and hatred ultimately led to her quest for more power in the coming decades.

For Germany, the military leadership's cost-benefit analysis failed to bring an acceptable end to the war. The German's hoped the unrestricted submarine campaign would increase the cost of the war on Britain causing her to sue for peace. Germany could then dictate peace terms to France and Russia. The benefit of eliminating Britain from the war seemed to exceed the likely cost of the US entering the war. Since the US was considered already involved in the war by providing economic and financial aid to the Allies, the cost was seen as minimal. Furthermore, when considering that America's possibility of entering the war was mentioned, it was assumed with Britain out of the war America would not be able to make an impact. But she did. America assisted Britain in developing an effective convoy system to protect commerce that ultimately decreased the effects of the unrestricted submarine campaign. The escalation failed to predict accurately the actions of both Britain and America. Instead of coercing Britain to sue for peace, Germany's approach only prolonged her suffering, expending her only military advantage.

In 1916, with her domestic and economic conditions in decline and her only ally wanting peace, the prospects of continuing appeared foolhardy. But, by this time, the military leadership was the dominant force in controlling the war. As a result, Germany's focus became engrossed with eliminating Britain's influence on the continent. Chancellor Bethmann's holistic approach of considering the domestic and international repercussions of the unrestricted submarine campaign was lost. Ludendorff's analysis failed to show how German's military condition would improve or how Britain's military condition would decline. Instead, he deduced that England's will to continue would culminate. Predicting

how a country's will to fight will be affected by economic strangulation appears to be a serious short-fall in this cost-benefit decision.

Finally, in the fall of 1918, when Germany realized the benefit of continued fighting outweighed her costs, she sought peace. By this time though, Germany was helpless and had no other options. The Spring Offensives of 1918 ended in August with 'the black day of the German Army.'⁴² Germany's last means of resistance was spent and an Allied push was rolling back her lines. With the army spent, Germany's ability to seek peace on negotiated terms was lost. Ludendorff began pressing the Chancellor frantically to negotiate a peace settlement. After the military twice failed to end the war on favorable terms, the primacy of control of the war finally shifted back to the political leadership. Had she sought peace in January 1918 when she still had the means to resist, Germany might have reached a more favorable settlement.

Realizing her precarious situation, Germany looked at Wilson's fourteen point peace plan as an acceptable framework to seek peace. Germany was willing to pay the price in lost territories in order to reap the benefit of consolidating her domestic power. The effect of the disagreement among the Allies on how to prosecute the peace was not accurately assessed. The United States was not inclined to dominate European affairs at the time, and her views were not shared by all countries in the alliance. As a result, Germany never realized the benefits of her political decision because she failed to identify the Allied stance for a peace settlement. Even if she had, given her weakened military, economic, and domestic conditions, Germany was in no position to bargain. The opportunity had past.

The primary cause of Germany's embarrassed defeat can be linked to the shift of power from the political to the military leadership that occurred in early 1917. Failing to account for her domestic, economic, and external condition, Ludendorf continued to use every military option available to seek victory. When all military options were expended, political leadership re-emerged. It appears that when the prosecution of a war is conducted by narrowly focused military leadership, insensitive to internal and external factors, a rational cost-benefit approach to war termination is a futile expectation.

B. Japan's Dilemma for Peace

Japan's attempts to end their war with the US on negotiated conditions, instead of accepting unconditional surrender, provide an other example to analyze the difficulties of war termination from a cost-benefit approach. To gain an appreciation of the Pacific War during World War II, one must first understand Japan's motive in attacking the US at Pearl Harbor. In response to Japan's occupation of Indochina in July 1941, the US abrogated their commercial treaty with Japan, leaving the materially weak country with its back against the wall. To curb her aggression further, the US encouraged the Dutch East Indies to cease exporting oil to Japan. These pressures led to negotiations between Japan and the US in which the US demanded that Japan relinquish all of its conquests in Manchuria and China.⁴³ These demands ran counter to Japan's designs to dominate Asia. In order to protect her aims, Japan initiated war with the US at Pearl Harbor in hopes of destroying the entire US Pacific fleet, the only immediate military threat to her conquests.

Interestingly, Japan's initiation of the war was based on the idea that inaction was unacceptable given her circumstances. War was not initiated as a result of a positive

benefit-cost calculation, but rather resulted from rough calculations that costs of failing to take action exceeded the potential risks and costs of war. The consequences of military inaction was perceived by the Japan High Command as unacceptable.⁴⁴ The Japanese military based their assessment of the outcome of the war entirely on hope:

It is difficult to predict the termination of war, and it would be well-nigh impossible to expect the surrender of the United States. However we cannot exclude the possibility that the war may end because of a great change in American public opinion ... Meanwhile, we hope that we will be able to influence the trend of affairs and bring the war to an end.⁴⁵

With the initiation of the war based on the unacceptability of inaction, and its termination based on hope, can the cost-benefit model explain war termination in Japan's case? According to the model, Japan should have pursued her war aims until the war reached a point where the costs of continuing were not worth the objectives, at which time Japan would seek peace. On the surface, the cost-benefit model appears to be plausible.

Japanese had two main objectives at the beginning of the war. The first was the successful resolution of the war with China. The second focused on the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. During the course of pursuing these aims, the Japanese added a third: to avoid a long war with the US by producing a devastating and disheartening victory at Pearl Harbor.⁴⁶ In post-war interviews, Japanese military leaders stated:

By the surprise attack on 7 December, Japan would deprive the United States of a major part of its naval strength. The supremacy in the Pacific gained thereby would be used to occupy the strategically important Pacific islands, and to establish a "Pacific wall," impregnable to all American attacks. This chain, properly fortified would be indefinitely defended. Japan's war potential was regarded as sufficient to sustain such a defensive operation. The impossibility of breaking through the system of Japanese island defenses would soon become obvious to the United States.⁴⁷

As the war worsened in 1944 and the US seemed determined to have an unconditional surrender, the defense of the home island surfaced as a minimum objective of the war during discussions between leaders.⁴⁸

Japan's costs during the war were truly enormous. A few details should illustrate their magnitude. At the beginning of the war, Japan's population was about seventy million people. Battle deaths alone amounted to 1,270,000 soldiers. In the defeat at Leyte, the Japanese lost 65,000 battle hardened troops and the backbone of her fleet.⁴⁹ By the end of 1944, the Japanese navy had few strategic options for it had lost 7 of 12 battleships, 19 of 25 aircraft carriers, 103 of 160 submarines, 31 of 47 cruisers, and 118 of 158 destroyers. Japan's navy was essentially reduced to conducting "bleeding" operations against the US fleet.⁵⁰ The economic costs can be best summarized with the following:

From November 1942 until about the middle of fiscal year 1944, the Japanese put every effort into raising the whole level of output and increasing even further the proportion utilized for war purposes. In the end, they failed. By the time 1944 had been reached, Allied air and naval attacks upon Japanese shipping, qualitative deficiencies in Japanese labor force, dwindling stockpiles of raw materials, and ill-conceived and poorly executed dispersal programs had all contributed their deleterious effects to the economy, and a decline in production had inevitably set in. Thus, before Japan capitulated, she had already lost the war economically.⁵¹

Japanese losses in men, money, and material should have been sufficient to demonstrate that their initial war aims were not achievable. Moreover, the Japanese leaders had to know about and understand the significance of the costs and then apply these against their objectives.

It appears that the Japanese were aware of the accumulating costs but were so committed to the war effort that they avoided the logical implications that they should sue for peace. On 8 June 1945, a summary report on the world situation and the state of

national power was submitted to the Japanese Emperor for a basic policy decision on the future conduct of the war. The impact of the costs are apparent in the report that stated:

... the increasing tempo of Allied air raids have resulted in a serious disruption of land and sea communications and essential war production. The food situation has worsened and it has become increasingly difficult to meet the requirements of total war. Although morale is high, there is dissatisfaction with the present regime, and criticism of the government and the military is on the ascendancy. The people are losing confidence in their leaders, and the gloomy omen of deterioration of public morale is present. The spirit of public sacrifice is lacking and among leading intellectuals there are some who advocate peace negotiations as a way out. We are faced with insurmountable difficulties in the field of transportation and communications, and if we lose Okinawa we cannot hope to maintain planned communications with the Asian mainland after the end of the month. Our total production of steel, at present, is about one-fourth of our output during the same period last year. There is a strong possibility that a considerable portion of Japan's various industrial areas will soon have to suspend operations for want of coal. From midyear on, there will be shortages of basic industrial salts, making it difficult for us to produce light metals, synthetic oil, and explosives. Henceforth, prices will rise sharply – brining on inflation. This, in turn, will seriously undermine the wartime economy.⁵²

In light of this compelling assessment, factions in the Imperial Army argued that if Japan sought peace, the world at large would assume that Japan was surrendering and a complete split in the national unity and polity would result. Other factions in the Imperial Army claimed that Japan might be able to open peace negotiations after a success on the battlefield had been achieved. The army had concluded that Japan “had come to the fork in the road of destiny. The life or death of the nation was at stake.”⁵³

Beyond what appears logical, the army maintained its confidence that at least an operational success was still at hand. The Foreign Minister, who had been working to establish diplomatic talks with the Soviets, advised that there was no hope of the Soviet Union acting as a mediator between Japan and the United States. The meeting with the Emperor ended when all agreed with the Prime Minister who said, “There is only one way to win and that is by determination. When the whole nation possesses this will, then we

shall be able to achieve victory!”⁵⁴ In a strange way, the Japanese leadership appears to once again have based their fortunes on hope. Fanatical determination in preserving the authority of the Emperor appeared as the only benefit of the continued fighting. In fact, to understand why this disregard of costs occurred, one must examine the internal power struggles that took place in the Japanese government.

In July 1944, Prime Minister Tojo was forced to resign amidst accusations that he was ineffective in prosecuting the war effort. The senior statesman who campaigned for his resignation claimed new life was needed in the hearts and minds of the people if the nation was to overcome the difficulties besetting it. General Koiso, the General and Governor presiding over Korea, was selected as the next Prime Minister. With the loss of Saipan occurring just a week prior to accepting his new post, Koiso realized Japan was losing the war and that the outcome was irreversible. With no political clout to initiate peace, Koiso set himself the task to change the overall military strategy. He called for throwing Japan's dwindling military sources into an all-out effort to win a battle before seeking an end to the war on negotiated terms.⁵⁵

This idea of a decisive battle was motivated by the Imperial army's interest to maintain its morale. The army's faith in the superiority of the spiritual over the material had always regarded morale as an important service interest. To the army, the Allies demand for unconditional surrender, first pronounced at Casablanca in January 1943, was the ultimate embarrassment. The preservation of the national polity, the Emperor, was an essential condition for settling the war. Winning a final battle before negotiating a settlement was the army's idea of having won peace with honor rather than having lost the war.⁵⁶

The Imperial Navy saw things differently. Navy Minister Yonai felt the turning point of the war had come and gone at Midway in June 1942. The Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Takagi, who was commissioned to study the war's effects on its navy capability in 1943, knew then the war was a losing effort and openly proposed negotiating a settlement. Unlike their army compatriots, many naval officers had visited or trained in the United States and Britain and had acquired firsthand knowledge of the enemy's vast industrial bases. On the home front, however, the navy was no match for the army with its vast networks of associations throughout the government. The navy felt if Japan were to fight a decisive battle as a precursor to a peace settlement, the sooner it did so, the better.⁵⁷

With only symbolic support from the navy, Koiso attempted to consolidate his power by naming himself the war minister as well as the chief of staff of the army, in order to impose his strategic plan. Since his predecessor had done so in his last two months in power, he thought it appropriate to continue the precedent. When the army did not support the idea, he was forced to form the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (SCDW) which was designed to reconcile and coordinate diplomatic, military, and domestic policy. This council made up of diplomatic, military, finance, and domestic ministers was such a large gathering of diverse leadership that consensus was often difficult to achieve. At the same time, it allowed the army to exercise its vast network of influence which tempered any talk of peace. As a result, Koiso's decisive battle strategy, designed as a precursor to a negotiated peace, was approved by the SCDW on 19 August 1944.⁵⁸

When the Americans landed on Leyte on October 1944, Koiso received assurances that the army would take the offense, and the navy would allocate more ships for the island defenses. What followed in the next four months demonstrated the lack of control that Koiso appeared to have over the army. By December, just after he made a radio announcement to the Japanese people that the army was conducting a decisive battle which would bring the war to a suitable end, the Prime Minister learned that the army decided to abandon plans for their decisive battle on Leyte in favor of Luzon. Koiso was embarrassed, and the Japanese people were given their first firm basis for doubting an inevitable victory. At Luzon in mid January 1945, the army never did attempt to seize the initiative. Instead, the army refined its objective to a "weakening operation" to draw "blood" from the enemy. Finally in late February 1945, the army general staff and War Ministry decided that a strategy for a decisive battle to repel the expected invasion of the homeland was their best option.⁵⁹ With the navy nearly decimated in the Leyte Gulf, Koiso and the SCDW had no other choice but to accept this recommendation. Koiso's ability to determine the direction of the war was now being dictated to him by the Imperial Army and War Ministry.

When Leyte and Luzon fell into Allied control, Japan's thoughts of continuing, given their now weakened army and nearly non-existent navy, can only be attributed to the Imperial army's goal to achieve a decisive victory before seeking a negotiated settlement. To Koiso's credit, in the fall of 1944 and the early months of 1945, he attempted to establish peace negotiations with the Allies by secretly sending foreign diplomats to open peace discussions with both the Soviet Union and China. When American troops landed

on Okinawa on 1 April 1945, and when Stalin denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April, the Koiso government was replaced. When word got out that negotiation had been attempted, the army was outraged. These die-hard fanatics saw Koiso's attempts at peace through Moscow and China as a direct violation of the Axis Pact with Germany which strictly forbid any such diplomatic action. Ten days after Admiral Suzuki, a peace advocate, became the Premier, the War Minister ordered the arrest of four hundred persons suspected of harboring antiwar sentiments. With such hostility toward peace overtures in the air, one of Suzuki's first speeches to the Japanese people spoke of "fighting to the very end."⁶⁰

Oddly enough, when Germany fell to the Allies on 8 May 1945, Prime Minister Suzuki convinced the army that Japan needed a new ally and resumed Japan's "Moscow Policy." To the army leadership, Germany's surrender did not mean that all was irretrievably lost, but that it was necessary to acquire the Soviets as a new ally if they were to save the mainland. If the Imperial Army was to conduct a decisive homeland battle, it would need forces deployed in Manchuria.

The "Moscow Policy" was Japan's plan to have the Soviets mediate a peace settlement before the Potsdam Conference in late July 1945. After initial ambassadorial negotiations failed, the Emperor notified Moscow that a personal letter was to be carried directly to Stalin just before he left for the Potsdam Conference. In the letter, the Emperor stressed a desire for a speedy termination of hostilities but expressly rejected the "unconditional surrender." He added that the Japanese would be forced to fight to the bitter end if the US and Britain refused to make concessions that would safeguard Japan's "honor." Before leaving for the conference, Stalin refused to see Japan's Ambassador to

Moscow. When he returned on 6 August, the day the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Stalin notified Japan that the Soviet Union would be at war with her beginning the following day. Japan had failed to find an ally who would mediate a quick peace settlement and allow her to consolidate forces on her homeland.⁶¹

The Emperor failed to understand the role of a mediator in this case. Countries select a mediator based on neutrality and the fact that the mediator will have nothing to gain if the negotiations fail. On both accounts, Moscow failed to meet these criteria. Stalin had reputed the Neutrality Pact between the two countries in April and should have been expected to be interested in seeking amenities when Japan surrendered. Japan's logic was blinded by the idea of establishing one final stance on their homeland which they thought would provide an impetus for Allied concessions of the Potsdam Declaration. Had they selected a truly neutral country to mediate their concerns, many Japanese lives might have been saved. The apparent benefit of reestablishing neutrality with the Soviets appears to have clouded Japanese judgment as well as attempting to satisfy the Imperial Army's desire for a decisive battle on the homeland. To understand why the US was not approached earlier in the war, one must appreciate Japan's perceptions of the US.

Japanese views of the Americans were again clouded by the Imperial Army's assessments. The army focused on fighting the war rather than considering bargaining for its end. On overall Allied Strategy, the army claimed, "The enemy is attempting to direct its major operations against the Japanese mainland in an effort to end the war quickly."⁶² With regards to the US domestic political situation, the Imperial army assessed the following:

The problems resolving around manpower resources, war-time production and national economy ... have eased with the end of hostilities against Germany... However, the partial demobilization and industrial reconversion following the end of hostilities in Europe aroused optimism about the war situation and the desire to grab post-war profits ... To counteract such latent weaknesses in the domestic situation, the government has warned the nation of the problem and necessity of concluding the war with Japan ... Directing the war against Japan will be a complicated task for Truman, the new President, because of the difficulty in achieving unified control over the military and political activities, especially in coordinating foreign and domestic policies which are striving for the early conclusion of the war with a strategy of the army leaders. This factor will be a further detriment to a brief Pacific War ... Should the United States be defeated in the battle for Japan itself, it is inevitable that confidence in Truman and the military will be lost, and the depreciation of fighting morale will ensue.⁶³

Here again, the Imperial Army attempted to predict the loss of US morale in a decisive battle of the homeland as a projected benefit to continued resistance. Their logic lacked any concrete analysis or consideration of battle losses both in men and material. The idea of establishing a negotiated peace as a benefit to the continued fighting seemed to have been lost in this analysis.

After the war, Foreign Minister Togo claimed Japanese did not avoid direct negotiations, but rather it was Britain and the US who avoided negotiating for peace by forwarding the proposition of unconditional surrender. He claimed that his country was not willing to accept the Potsdam Declaration of unconditional surrender but sought a negotiated settlement. The Japanese government was not willing to compromise the sovereign ruler, the Emperor. They understood that unconditional surrender meant the complete overthrow of the Emperor. By never directly establishing diplomatic communications with the US or Britain until her final surrender, Japan had no means of determining whether a negotiated peace would have been possible after a local victory or under any other circumstances.

After experiencing the devastation of two atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war, on 10 August 1945, Japan notified the Allies that they were willing to accept the terms of Potsdam, but under one condition: that the declaration does not compromise the prerogative of His Majesty as the Sovereign Ruler. Two days later, Tokyo received the American answer, which stated in part:

“from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers ... the ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”⁶⁴

On the very next day, it took the Emperor's direct intervention at an imperial council meeting to command his subordinates to accept the terms of surrender. He was willing to sacrifice the throne for the benefit of averting further Japanese bloodshed. When the recorded message by the Emperor was set to be broadcast in Tokyo, it took local military commanders to put down a plot by junior army officers designed to prevent the announcement.⁶⁵ The fanatical militaristic fervor that developed in the Imperial Army to protect the polity nearly prevented the Emperor's logical decision.

First discussed under the Koiso government, Japan's deliberations to achieve a negotiated peace as a benefit to their continued fighting when defeat was evident occurred for several reasons. The first and foremost lies in the fanatical Imperial Army's ability to direct strategic decisions. Realizing the fall of Saipan provided an air base from which to bomb the homeland, Koiso knew the war was lost and needed to end soon. The Imperial Army's strategy of a decisive victory in the Philippine Islands, as a prelude to a negotiated peace, was not only never adhered to, but changed completely. The Premier had lost

control of the military direction of the war. Although Koiso's secret diplomatic peace overtures to China and Moscow were ill-conceived, he realized that negotiations were needed before Japan became crippled as a nation. Had he established his intentions with the Allies directly, Koiso may have gained the support of the silent civilian majority in the SCDW. Establishing the SCDW was the Imperial Army's method of controlling the war and diffused Koiso's ability to coordinate an acceptable solution.

Even if Koiso had established diplomatic communications with the Allies to determine the feasibility of a negotiated peace, the Imperial Army may not have agreed. Without complete control over his military forces, Koiso's attempts to bargain peace terms were highly unlikely to succeed.

Clearly by the time Germany surrendered, in April 1945, Japan's military, economic, and domestic conditions were all in decline. The selection of the Soviet Union as a mediator for a negotiated peace was poorly calculated. With the war against Germany won, the Soviets had nothing to gain by mediating a peace for Japan. In fact, having just fought against a common enemy, the selection, although aimed at relieving pressure of the Japanese Manchurian Army, defied diplomatic common sense. Strangely enough, all these facts that presented the desperate state of affairs, both internal and external, were presented to both the SCDW and the Emperor in the early June 1945 meeting. Although the costs to this point were astronomical, the decision to continue was based on the perceived need to protect the Emperor from unconditional terms. The benefit of protecting Imperial Majesty outweighed all costs that might occur as a result. In the end, it took the Emperor, the very element the Japanese army hoped to protect, to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The Emperor clearly realized that surrender was the only

option that would cease the devastation occurring in cities throughout Japan. He correctly assessed that stopping the war before a home island invasion would prevent further destruction of the Japanese society.

Two decades later, the United States would face another Asian country with even stronger convictions. Here the rational approach to force an enemy to capitulate would be attempted again and again. Again and again it would fail

c. US and the Vietnam War

The United States efforts to resolve the Vietnam War provide numerous data points from which to analyze war termination from a cost-benefit approach. Unlike the two previous case studies, the Vietnam War was fought as a limited war from the United States perspective. Beginning with President Truman and continuing through the Johnson administration, United States foreign policy centered on strengthening all freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression, irrespective of those nations strategic importance to the US. Thus, the prime American objective in the war in Indo-China was to prevent the communist domination of South Vietnam by supporting her government with both military and financial aid.⁶⁶ Once the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed in Congress, in August 1964, granting President Lyndon Johnson authority to deploy US forces to Vietnam, the direct intervention in Vietnam began.⁶⁷ The benefit of such an endeavor was seen as the establishment of a democratic government in South Vietnam.

United States' attempts to terminate the Vietnam War could be explained as applying just enough pressure to insure the enemy's costs exceeded potential gains thereby leading to a conclusion that backing down was preferable to continued fighting.⁶⁸ This

coercive method of imposing the cost-benefit analysis onto the enemy often neglected measuring the reciprocal costs and benefits to the United States. Gradual escalation of both troop deployments and aerial bombardments exemplified the US's coercive techniques. In the end, the United States would have to evaluate their own aims against mounting costs.

In the summer of 1964, before taking any direct military action, President Johnson began the first of several secret diplomatic efforts to convince North Vietnam to cease assisting the Vietcong in the South. His offers were a typical carrot-and-stick approach:

... if the Communists agreed to cease their assistance to the Vietcong and end the conflict, the United States would provide them with economic aid and even diplomatic recognition. If not, they could anticipate American air and naval attacks against North Vietnam.⁶⁹

North Vietnam Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, continually rejected these gestures unless the Americans withdrew from Vietnam and accepted Vietcong participation in a neutral South Vietnamese coalition government.⁷⁰

After winning the presidential election in 1964, Johnson attempted to resolve the war by sustained bombing over North Vietnam over the next four years, offering to suspend attacks in exchange for productive peace negotiations. The American air campaign against the North, called Operation Rolling Thunder, went on almost daily from March 1965 to November 1968, dropping roughly eight hundred thousand tons of munitions per day. Rolling Thunder's objectives were first, to break the morale of Hanoi's leadership and compel them to call off the southern insurgency, and second, to weaken the Communist fighting capacity by impeding the flow of their men and supplies south. The purpose of Johnson's call for negotiations was to either clear a path toward the restoration

of peace, or move toward increased military action, depending on the reaction from the North.⁷¹

With each year's proposals denied by the Communist, American troop strength in Vietnam climbed from 200,000 in 1965 to over 500,000 by the end of 1968.⁷² Each year Johnson escalated the war, he hoped to increase the cost on the North. What he often failed to realize was the costs were increasing for America as well. By the end of 1968, Americans killed in action had grown to 14,314, from 1,369 in late 1965.⁷³ In response to these increasing costs, the fall of 1967 brought many anti-war protests across the US. The largest demonstrations against the war met in front of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., attended by an estimated 100,000 people. To combat this anti-war enthusiasm, Johnson brought General Westmoreland back home to make upbeat speeches about Vietnam.⁷⁴

The 1968 Tet Offensive, launched in January and February of 1968, was the largest Communist offensive of the war and was designed to break the military stalemate. The offensive attacked province capitals and military installations throughout the south. The Communist goal of Tet was to drive a wedge between the US and South Vietnam in order to show the South Vietnamese people that the US was vulnerable despite its immense power. They believed that the South was ripe for a revolution and that the weary government soldiers, dislocated peasants, frustrated religious factions, fractious youth, and other unhappy elements of the southern population would rise up in opposition to the Saigon and American authorities. The result was that Vietcong and North Vietnamese attacks throughout the South were decimated, nearly wiping out the Vietcong organization and thoroughly setting back the North's fighting capacity.⁷⁵

Although the Communist were decisively defeated in the effort, the American public was horrified as the scenes from Tet were shown on the nightly news. Having been told by the commanding general himself that all was going well the previous fall, the American public became disillusioned about the war. The Johnson administration was backed into a dilemma. Westmoreland was asking for 200,000 more soldiers, and the American people were calling for the end of the war. The additional troops needed required the call up of reserve forces. This was something Johnson was not willing to do. After his approval rating dropped from 48 to 36 percent, Johnson announced on 31 March 1968, he would not seek reelection and he restricted US air strikes in hopes of establishing a settlement with North Vietnam. Again, both parties repeated the same arguments: the US wanted the North out of South Vietnam and the North rejected the demands and insisted that the Saigon regime include Vietcong representatives.⁷⁶

Johnson's failure to calculate both his own costs of escalation, and the North's determination, appears to have been his largest mistakes. The Americanization of the war, that saw the US take complete control of all military efforts, allowed the South Vietnamese to yield the responsibility for the war to America. South Vietnam's inability to both govern and prosecute the war drew the US to take this dominate role. As this occurred, the US was drawn deeper and deeper into the hostilities. The war quickly became America's to win or lose. The Communist, determined not to concede, not only paralleled America's efforts with men and material, but waged a political war within the South. Essentially, the north conducted an unlimited war while the US was attempting to use limited means. Johnson could not apply enough pressure to have the Communist back

down from their potential aims. Seeing the domestic and political turmoil in the South, the Communists had no reason to believe that they would not win.

When President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissenger came to power, they believed they had the requisite knowledge, boldness, and imagination to achieve a satisfactory outcome to the long American involvement in Vietnam. In early 1969, public opinion polls showed that Americans wanted to end the war quickly while at the same time stopping the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. Yet, these same people did not want America either to lose or to escalate efforts. Ironically, not many were concerned with the survival of the South Vietnam government. With such a dichotomy of public opinion, Nixon was determined from the beginning to end the war with honor.⁷⁷

The new administration's initial efforts to end the war were both internationally broader and domestically focused. Internationally, Nixon pressured the Soviets to influence Hanoi to cease their intervention in the South or détente would not begin between the US and Russia. At the same time, two-tiered Paris peace negotiations began. At the first level, the US and Hanoi were to mediate a mutual withdrawal of all external forces in South Vietnam. The second tier was designed to have Saigon representatives and National Liberation Force (NLF) officials bargain for a political settlement of the civil war. Finally, Nixon expanded the war by conducting a secret aerial bombing campaign against North Vietnam Army (NVA) sanctuaries in Cambodia. By the summer of 1969, as had been the case with the Johnson administration, all diplomatic efforts failed, and the secret bombing campaign began to leak to the press. In September 1969 during a National Security Council meeting, Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissenger,

astutely confessed, "I can't believe that a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn't have a breaking point."⁷⁸ Frustrated with the entire process, Nixon tried a new approach.⁷⁹

On 3 November 1969, Nixon initiates his nation-building concept called Vietnamization. The South Vietnamese army was going to pick up more of the responsibility of the war and US troops began coming home. Vietnamization was Nixon's method of allowing Saigon to save herself. Americans overwhelmingly approved the idea. A public opinion poll conducted after Nixon's speech showed seventy percent of Americans supported the concept.⁸⁰ As time would demonstrate, the policy was mere fantasy, since the South was incapable of both governing or defending itself.

In the spring of 1970, Nixon's decision to send US forces into Cambodia in order to save a friendly government from Communist aggression not only widened the war, but also began to split public opinion at home. In Congress, attempts were made to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and cut off all funding for military operations in Cambodia. College campuses erupted in protest over the sudden widening of the war that Nixon had promised to end. To counter these anti-war sentiments, working men and women began to vocalize support for Nixon's action. Americans soon were deeply at odds with each other over the Vietnam War.⁸¹

As 1972 began, both the battlefields of Vietnam and the American homefront were calm. Nixon planned diplomatic visits to both China and Moscow. He used these conferences to link subsequent progress toward détente to Moscow's and Peking's willingness to pressure Hanoi into negotiating an end to the war. Expecting a call by their communist allies to press for peace and hoping to end the military stalemate, on 30 March

1972, North Vietnam launched their Spring Offensive. In response to this all out aggression in the south, Nixon revived the air war, coded-named LINEBACKER, that had been on hold since 1968 to beat back the North's attack. Although both the USSR and China issued pro forma criticisms of the US action, privately both put pressure on Hanoi to end the war. Domestic reaction to the air campaign showed strong public support and paid political dividends in the upcoming elections that year. By October, Kissinger had worked out a compromise with North Vietnam but it was disapproved by the South Vietnamese. When Kissinger brought the South's concerns back to the peace conferences in Paris, the North Vietnamese envoy responded by hardening their stance. By mid December, peace efforts once again broke off, and Nixon once again attempted to resolve the impasse with force.⁸²

Starting on 18 December 1972, LINEBACKER II, the largest American air armada of the war, began bombing North Vietnam. Nixon signaled to Hanoi that if North Vietnam agreed to resume peace talks, the US would stop the bombing. On 29 December, Hanoi consented, and by late January the Paris Accords were signed by all parties. America's longest war had finally ended. On 30 April 1975, the Communist conquered Saigon. The Vietnam War ended in victory for the VC and NVA forces. The long American effort to create a non-Communist state in South Vietnam failed.⁸³

The gradual increase in the scale of the war during the Johnson Administration by the infusion of US forces was not in accordance with the practice of US military doctrine. The traditional U.S. military approach entailed massive concentrations of firepower against enemy forces in order to defeat them quickly. This incremental approach resulted from the fear that a sudden and extensive escalation might lead to direct Chinese or Soviet

intervention. It further points to the President's reluctance either to lose the war without greater effort or fight it at any greater cost than necessary. The theory of limited war that called for the restricted, flexible, controlled, and proportionate use of force to persuade the adversary to terminate the war was the prevalent approach of the time.

The result of the gradual approach in Vietnam permitted the war to drag on at increasing cost and public opposition without the satisfaction of anticipating a clear-cut victory. Even though the North incurred increased costs in military terms, they were determined to fight for the total stakes: the incorporation of the south into a unified Communist Vietnam. US self-restraint failed to realize this imbalance of interest and began to withdraw forces when the cost of the war became disproportionate to their interests. America's limited approach was doomed to fail against a belligerent willing to wage unlimited efforts.

By attempting to impose greater cost on the North than the US thought Communist were willing to accept, they failed to predict the will of the North to continue to fight. They realized that South Vietnam was incapable of both governing and defending themselves. The American public was not willing to waste her blood and treasure on the efforts. As a way to achieve "peace with honor," the Nixon administration adopted Vietnamization as a way to turn this civil war back over to the South Vietnamese.

Although LINEBACKER II brought all parties to a settlement, it did not cause the North to cease in continuing toward their goal - the unification of Vietnam. Instead of causing the Communist to abort their aims, US gradual escalation policy only prolonged the struggle. Time was a disadvantage and reversed the process. The costs of prosecuting the Vietnam War in men and material soon outweighed the benefit of establishing a viable

democratic government in South Vietnam. After 1968, the US changed their aims from defeating the Communist insurgency to providing the South a framework to resolve the issue. The benefit of the Paris Peace Accords allowed the US to withdraw from Vietnam while the South was still under a democratic government. It was only a matter of time before the unlimited efforts of the North overcame the limited American approach.

*"It often happens in wars that the weaker party makes no attempt to seek peace when its military strength can still influence the enemy, but fights until it has lost all its power to bargain"*⁸⁴

Fred Ikle

*"Wars usually end when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength."*⁸⁵

Geoffrey Blainey

IV. Conclusion

These case studies have exemplified that a nation's use of the cost-benefit calculation model to achieve war termination is not always sensitive only to military, economic, and domestic conditions, or expectations of external assistance. Most of the reasons why this occurs lies in the deviations from the model assumptions seen in the case studies. The variations from the model in the total warfare that Germany and Japan experienced, differed from the case of a limited approach the US took in Vietnam. The basic underlining assumption of the model that governments act as uniactors and in a rational manner appears questionable. In the first two cases, military leadership dominated political opinion. This spawned internal power struggles that ultimately caused their countries to capitulate before achieving the benefit of their original aims but only after continued resistance had ceased to be rationally based solely on economic or power terms. In the last case, the US and South Vietnam governments were not always acting with the same aims in mind and certainly underestimated the price for success the North was willing to pay.

At times, it is difficult for belligerents to estimate their opponents values and goals. Nor can one side accurately place a value on their own or their opponents' costs and perceived benefits. Therefore, it is a difficult proposition to make the necessary cost-

benefit calculations concerning the decision of when to terminate a war. Furthermore, participants are often unable or unwilling to measure the cost of continued fighting. To compound this difficulty in measuring the cost in blood and material with expected gains or losses in either prestige, influence or territory lie the internal conflicts and international uncertainty surrounding the war. Within a belligerent government, internal power struggles often occur over when and under what conditions the initiation of a peace settlement should occur. On a global scale, the actions of allies and neutrals is often unpredictable. Even if these factors could be accurately measured and compared with a common denominator, the historical examples in this monograph show that nations cannot always expect to act rationally. Predicting the amount of will your enemy possesses and forecasting its capitulation while attempting to achieve your aims may not be possible.

The monograph attempted to demonstrate an acceptable standard of judgment which should stem from an accurate assessment of one's military, economic, domestic, and diplomatic conditions. In the unlimited war case studies these conditions were ignored. The totality of such warfare often brings the military leadership to the forefront, thereby blinding the belligerent's awareness of these conditions. Political leaders' assessments end up being manipulated by promises of military victories. The wars continued beyond what each country could militarily accomplish in support of their peace aims. The limited approach and sheer length of the Vietnam War caused these conditions in the US to be much more elusive when assessing the costs and benefits of the war.

In the first two case studies, both Germany and Japan continued to fight long after their goals appeared achievable. In hindsight, both these countries actions appear irrational. In early 1917, Germany's only ally, Austria-Hungary, was pushing for a peace

settlement. Her economic and domestic conditions were declining under the strangulation of a British blockade. More importantly, the military leadership ascended to power. They quickly overcame the Chancellor's cautious approach toward war termination. Instead of minimizing her losses after she stopped the Allied Somme offensive in late 1916, Germany launched her unrestricted submarine campaign hoping to coerce Britain to sue for peace. Instead, it escalated and broadened the war. The German's failure to calculate the effects of America and numerous other countries entering the war against her ultimately caused her capitulation. Yet, had Germany coordinated diplomatic efforts with her military escalation she might have been able to prevent the United States from entering the war while inducing Britain to accept negotiated terms. Finally, when all nations involved did agree to an armistice in 1918, Germany's assumption that Wilson's "impartial justice" would be the basis of future negotiations never came to pass. The Treaty of Versailles quickly became known to the Germans as "The Dictated Peace." Germany failed to realize the different perspectives of the Allied countries. Britain and France wanted to see Germany punished for the war and return to the balance of power, while Wilson thought a lasting peace was possible with his idea of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The treaty's "War Guilt" clause, which blamed Germany for all the destruction, ultimately sowed the seed for World War II. Both Germany's attempts at utilizing the cost-benefit calculation model failed her miserably.

Japan's application of a cost-benefit approach to war termination was woefully inadequate. By her own estimates, Japan's initiation of the conflict was based entirely on hope. As early as June 1942, after the Battle of Midway, the Imperial Navy considered her country destined for defeat. Yet, because the Imperial Army dominated domestic

decision making and was resolved to maintain the army's morale, catastrophic losses in the Philippine Islands and on Okinawa incredibly caused her to continue to fight. The idea of maintaining Japan's honor by placing the conditions of peace negotiations on an elusive battlefield success fueled by fanatical determination appears to defy logic. Prime Minister Koiso was continually misled to believe that the army was determined to make a stand and achieve a decisive win, which was his prerequisite for initiating negotiations. The killing of many peace sympathizers in early April of 1945 quickly caused the "doves" to rethink their methods for peace. Finally, Japan's venture for a mediated peace through the Soviets was a dismal failure. Their choice of the Soviets as mediator was grossly miscalculated. Finally, if it had not been for the forceful decision of the Emperor to accept the United States peace terms, an invasion of Japan's homeland may have occurred, bringing unimaginable losses for both sides.

Finally the United States actions in Vietnam, viewed from the cost-benefit calculation model, terribly miscalculated the North's determination to achieve her goal. Gradualism, domestic public opinion, domestic policy and bankrupt diplomacy, all clouded US war termination efforts. The Communist were willing to pay any price to unite Vietnam while the US leadership was taking an incremental approach to achieve their ends. The US continually attempted to increase the cost of North Vietnam's intervention in the South by escalating troop deployments and aerial bombings. Yet, at all diplomatic talks the North persisted in demanding NLF representation in any future South Vietnam government. Throughout the mid and late 1960's, The United States continually failed to evaluate the cost the North was willing to pay for her ultimate goal of unification. To exacerbate the war efforts, domestic protest only provided more pressure on the

administrations to end the war quickly. Initially carrying the burden of the war during the Johnson administration, the United States under the Nixon administration shifted the responsibility back on the South and sought peace negotiations while still wheeling devastating aerial bombing campaigns. In the end, Vietnamization was neither a winning nor losing method but rather a way of bowing out gracefully.

Ironically, it was the US détente with China that North Vietnam perceived would result in China pressuring them into a peace settlement short of their goals. This caused the North to launch their Spring Offensive in 1972. Because they were badly beaten and unable to make another military offensive for two to three years, the North finally accepted a settlement in Paris in January of 1973. After nearly ten years of combat, Nixon claimed "peace with honor" was achieved. Only two short years later, after the US withdrew her military and financial support from the South, the Communist united Vietnam. Instead of having her opponent realize that the marginal cost had outweighed the benefit, the US was the one to realize this deficit and withdrew from the war without achieving its initial goal of stopping the spread of communism.

The monograph has shown that the cost-benefit model does not always provide an acceptable framework to anticipate war termination. What is rational to one country may not be rational to another. Although military, domestic, economic, and diplomatic conditions may be declining, a country's desire to continue fighting may persist. The costs measured by these declining conditions, although, they may outweigh the benefits of a political aim, is not always accurately perceived by decision-makers. And when they are, peace is not always the first option attempted. Understanding how the many other factors, such as ideology, religion, societal values, and governmental structure relate to friendly

and enemy cost-benefit calculations, may be the only method in which the model can provide some effective analysis. Although US army and joint doctrine requires leverage on the battlefield in order for political aims to be achieved, planners must understand that when this leverage is achieved, termination will not necessarily follow. Military strength is only one instrument of national power which affects an enemy's will to resist. Sun Tzu once said, "...one who excels in warfare is able to make himself unconquerable, but cannot necessarily cause the enemy to be conquerable."⁸⁶ Rational military operations that appear to overwhelm an enemy's will to resist are not necessarily fool-proof.

In order for the model to be used effectively in shaping strategic policy, senior political and military leaders must skillfully formulate, coordinate, and apply the ends, ways, and means relationship across all national instruments of power.⁸⁷ With a focus on the ends/benefits verses means/costs, strategic policy-makers can at least develop a framework in which to make judicious decisions. In times of conflict, the emergence of previously mentioned factors can quickly influence these calculations and must be prudently weighed. Because the enemy has a vote in war, the process is often very problematic. None the less, it appears to be the only rational method in which to logically frame one's thoughts.

ENDNOTES

¹ B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy* (New York, 1964), p.351

² For views in favor of the notion that the decision to terminate a war is a rational cost benefit calculation, see Frank L. Klingberg, "Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10, no. 2 (June, 1966), pp.129-171. John Voevodsky, "Quantitative Behavior of Warring Nations," *The Journal of Psychology*, 72 (Summer, 1969), pp. 269-292. Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 27-28. Lewis F. Richardson, "Mathematical Theory of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 3 (June, 1957), pp. 249-299.

³ Joseph A. Jr. Engelbrecht, "War Termination: Why Does a State Decide to Stop Fighting." Student Thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Science, Columbia University, (New York, 1992), p. 31.

⁴ See note 2 above.

⁵ Both U.S. Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington D.C., Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993), p.6-23 and U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington D.C., Headquarters Department of Defense, 1995), p.1-9 link military operations to political objectives. JP 3-0 specifically requires the military leadership to advise political leaders on the military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability in terms of time, cost, and number of forces required for war termination. It further explains that negotiating power stems from military successes and military potential. It concludes by stating that once an opponent shifts his aims to reducing losses, instead of maintaining or extending gains, the possibilities for peace negotiations improve.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 69 and p.579.

⁷ Ibid, p. 92.

⁸ Michael I. Handel, "War Termination - A Critical Survey," *Termination of Wars*, edited by Nissan Oren (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1982), pp.55-57.

⁹ James D.D. Smith, *Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp.103-108.

¹⁰ Ibid, pp.108-111.

¹¹ Ibid, pp.112-119.

- ¹² Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p.84.
- ¹³ Morton H. Halperin, "War Termination as a Problem in Civil-Military Relations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 392 (November 1970), pp.86-95.
- ¹⁴ Robert Randle, "The Domestic Origins of Peace," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 392 (November 1970), pp.76-85.
- ¹⁵ Lewis F. Richardson, "War Moods," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, no. 3 (1957), pp.249-299.
- ¹⁶ Frank L. Klingberg, "Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no.2 (June 1966), pp.129-171.
- ¹⁷ John Voevodsky, "Quantitative Behavior of Warring Nations," The Journal of Psychology 72 (1969), pp.269-292.
- ¹⁸ Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in World Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.x.
- ¹⁹ Clausewitz, p.117.
- ²⁰ Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, INC., 1954), pp.26-27.
- ²¹ J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, Inc., 1956), p. 268.
- ²² Corelli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Supreme Command in the First World War, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 272-273.
- ²³ C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War, 1914-1918, (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1936), p.390.
- ²⁴ Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler, The World in the Crucible, 1914-1919, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984), p.204.
- ²⁵ Cruttwell, p.378.
- ²⁶ Schmitt and Vedeler, pp. 237-238.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p.239.

²⁸ Cruttwell, p.378.

²⁹ Fuller, p. 268.

³⁰ Ikle, p. 48.

³¹ Schulz, p. 35.

³² See Schulz Chapter 7 for how Germany's military collapse led to the accomplishment of a parliamentary government prior to their request for an armistice.

³³ See Henry Kissenger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 225 for the outline of Wilson's fourteen point peace plan.

³⁴ See Schulz Ch.8 for an explanation of Germany's complex domestic governmental changes that occurred in October & November 1918.

³⁵ Kissenger, pp. 221-222.

³⁶ Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1991), pp.93-97.

³⁷ Kissenger pp.237-240.

³⁸ See Sharp pp.87-101 for an explanation and repercussions of the "War Guilt" clause in the Treaty of Versailles.

³⁹ Schulz, p. 179.

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 192-193.

⁴¹ Sharp, p.72.

⁴² Cruttwell, p.550.

⁴³ Kissenger, p. 392.

⁴⁴ James L. Foster and Gary D. Brewer, And the Clocks were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, March 1976), p.8.

⁴⁵ Nobutaka Ike, Japan's Decision for War: Records of 1941 Policy Conferences, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), p.133.

⁴⁶ Gordon Prague, Miracle at Midway, edited by Donald Goldstein and Katrine Dillon, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), p. 262-363.

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⁴⁹ William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1978), pp.471-472.

⁵⁰ Leon V. Sigal, Fighting to the Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.38.

⁵¹ Butow, p.11.

⁵² Ibid, p.94.

⁵³ Ibid, pp.94-102.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.99.

⁵⁵ Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp.160-175.

⁵⁶ Sigal, pp.32-34.

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.33-34.

⁵⁸ Ibid, pp.35-36.

⁵⁹ Ibid, pp.37-39.

⁶⁰ Kecskemeti, pp.183-185.

⁶¹ See Kecskemeti, pp.180-195 for the implications of the "Moscow Policy" encountered by Japan's leadership.

⁶² Engelbrecht, p. 107.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Kecskemeti, p. 205.

⁶⁵ Sigal, p.3.

⁶⁶ Kissenger, p.622.

⁶⁷ Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p.27.

⁶⁸ Wallace J. Theis, "Searching for Peace: Vietnam & the Question of How Wars Ends." Polity (Spring 1975), p.315.

⁶⁹ Karnow, p.363.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.364.

⁷¹ See Karnow Chapters 11 and 12 for a complete explanation of President Johnson's strategy to end the Vietnam War.

⁷² Ibid, pp.695-697.

⁷³ George Donelson Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal, (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp.390-393.

⁷⁴ Moss, pp.225-232.

⁷⁵ To understand the magnitude of the Tet Offensive in both area and cost in casualties see Moss, pp.241-253 and Karnow, pp.538-558.

⁷⁶ For an explanation of how public opinion in the United States after the Tet Offensive affected US policy see Moss, pp.270-288 and Karnow, Chapter 14.

⁷⁷ Moss, p.298.

⁷⁸ Roger Morris, An Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissenger and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p.164.

⁷⁹ Ibid, pp.297-302.

⁸⁰ Karnow, pp.608-610.

⁸¹ Moss, pp.320-322.

⁸² Ibid, pp.330-342.

⁸³ See Karnow Chapter 16 for an explanation of North Vietnam's final military offensive and the United States evacuation and response.

⁸⁴ Ikle, p.34.

⁸⁵ Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p.122.

⁸⁶ Sun Tzu, Art of War, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p.183.

⁸⁷ Richard A. Chilcoat, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for the 21st Century Leaders, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA), p.7. This paper outlines the need for senior political and military leaders to development strategic art - the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.

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